Berkovich v. R. – TCC: Taxpayer not entitled to GHT/HST New Housing Rebate – home not a primary place of residence

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http://decision.tcc-cci.gc.ca/tcc-cci/decisions/en/item/73294/index.do New Window

Berkovich v. The Queen (September 8, 2014 – 2014 TCC 268) was a decision involving a claim for a GHT/HST New Housing Rebate. Two appeals were heard on common evidence:

[2] Zila Berkovich, the appellant, and Vladimir Khaimsky (“they”) entered into an amended agreement (“Agreement”) to purchase a new condominium to be constructed at 38 The Esplanade, Unit 213, Toronto (the “Unit”). The appellant applied for and was refused a rebate for the Unit. The Minister of National Revenue refused the rebate on the basis that the Unit was not acquired for use as their primary place of residence.

[3] The only issue is whether, at the time they signed the Agreement, they were purchasing the Unit with the intention of using it as their primary place of residence.

[4] If so, the appeal will be allowed and the appellant is entitled to the rebate. If not, the appeal will be dismissed.



[6] The appellant is 65 years of age and has been a registered real estate agent for 25 years. She works at Remax located at 185 Finch Avenue, Toronto.

[7] Mr. Khaimsky is 72 years of age and the common-law partner of the appellant of 17 years. Until February 2009, when he sustained a workplace injury to his leg, he was working as a fitter at Proline, located at Highways 7 and 27, Toronto and 20 kilometres from home (ie., Rockford Road). Driving from home to work in his car would take up to an hour and a half in the afternoon and 40 minutes in the morning.

[Footnote omitted]

The evidence disclosed that the appellants owned three other residential properties, one acquired within a day of the Unit:

[30] The facts that the Unit and the Navy Wharf property were purchased by them within one day of each other; the appellant’s extensive experience in real estate for 25 years; the existing Townsend rental property; and they resided in the Rockford property in 2005, where they resided at the time of the hearing, are indicators that the Unit was acquired as an investment.

[31] Furthermore, within one month of receiving legal title to the Unit and before they received their lawyer’s accounting for the transaction, photos were taken of the Unit to list it on the MLS. In February 2010, it was listed for sale and a few months later, it sold for a $140,000 profit; the transaction closed in July 2010. The appellant admitted that in 2011 she acquired the rights and title to the Charles Street property.

[32] Contrary to Mr. Khaimsky’s testimony that no other properties were purchased after the Unit was purchased and later sold, the appellant admitted in cross-examination that the day after the Unit was purchased they purchased the Navy Wharf property, and in 2011 she acquired the Charles Street property. Another inconsistency is that he said the Navy Wharf property was rented, the appellant said it was not. I do not find his testimony credible or reliable.

[33] These factors reflect their interest in opportunities in real estate, rather than an intent to leave the Rockford property and acquire the Unit as a primary residence.

The court reviewed a number of other aspects of the evidence and found them equally unsatisfactory. At the end of the day the court simply did not accept the appellants’ stated intent that they had acquired the Unit for use as their primary place of residence:

[61] I have concluded that neither the appellant nor Mr. Khaimsky provided credible or reliable testimony with respect to their stated intention and reject their stated intent. Given that, I conclude that the Unit was not acquired for use as their primary place of residence as required and within the meaning of paragraph 254(2)(b) of the Act. The appeal is dismissed.

[Footnote omitted]